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Abstract
We present IPchain, a blockchain to store the al-
locations and delegations of IP addresses, with the
aim of easing the deployment of secure interdomain
routing systems. Interdomain routing security is of
vital importance to the Internet since it prevents
unwanted traffic redirections. IPchain makes use
of blockchains’ properties to provide flexible trust
models and simplified management when compared
to existing systems. In this paper we argue that
Proof of Stake is a suitable consensus algorithm
for IPchain due to the unique incentive structure
of this use-case. We have implemented and evalu-
ated IPchain’s performance and scalability storing
around 150k IP prefixes in a 1GB chain.
1 Introduction
Inter-domain routing security is a pressing issue
in today’s Internet. In a nutshell, inter-domain
routing security encompasses the correct announce-
ment and propagation of IP prefixes across the Au-
tonomous Systems (AS) that conform the Internet.
Currently, the protocol that communicates these
announcements is BGP (Border Gateway Protocol,
RFC 4271). BGP security is typically based on
careful configuration via out-of-band mechanisms
where network operators tell each other which pre-
fixes to announce. Hence, an accidental misconfig-
uration or a malicious attacker controlling a BGP
router can divert traffic to networks which should
not receive it or make ranges of IP addresses un-
available (and effectively bringing Internet services
down). This attack is commonly know as prefix hi-
jacking and can be accomplished forging BGP an-
nouncements and propagating them to neighboring
ASes. We can find several real-life examples of pre-
fix hijacks [1–3].
Given the severity of these attacks, the IETF (In-
ternet Engineering Task Force) has designed a so-
lution to inter-domain routing security by means
of the RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure,
RFC 6480), a PKI repository to record the legiti-
mate owners of IP prefixes, AS numbers and ROAs
(Route Origin Authorization, a certificate to allow
an AS to announce an IP prefix).
Unfortunately, the global deployment of the
RPKI is slower than expected with only ∼9% of
the total /24 IPv4 address blocks owned by the five
Internet Registries being protected by the RPKI
(figure 1). The reasons of this have been exten-
sively analyzed and discussed in the literature [4–
8], mainly: (i) Centralized operations: Certifica-
tion Authorities (CAs) hold ultimate control of re-
sources in the RPKI. Since IP addresses are a crit-
ical asset of RPKI’s participants (especially ISPs),
they would like to have a higher degree of control
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Figure 1: Amount of RIPE’s IPv4 address space
covered by ROAs, in /24 units (source [12]). Of
the five Registries, RIPE is the one with highest
RPKI adoption
over them, but without loosing the security of be-
ing certified by a CA, i.e. balanced power between
users and CAs [9]. (ii) Management complexity:
PKIs are cumbersome to manage, e.g. when per-
forming a key rollover. In addition, deploying these
extensions is not trivial and requires trained staff
[5] and financial investment, and (iii) Exposure of
business relationships through peering agreements
in the RPKI [4]. In addition, the RPKI faces im-
plementation [10] and transparency [11] challenges.
In the light of this situation, in this paper we pro-
pose IPchain: a blockchain to store IP address allo-
cation and delegation data. IPchain leverages some
of blockchain’s properties to ease the deployment of
inter-domain routing security mechanisms. Three
of these properties stand out when compared to the
RPKI: (i) the ability to create flexible trust models,
providing a different balance of power between CAs
and downstream users, (ii) simplified management,
especially regarding common PKI operations such
as key rollover and (iii) auditability: blockchain’s
append-only ledger can detect possible configura-
tion errors even before a modification[13].
IP addresses share some fundamental character-
istics with coins, such as uniqueness or divisibility.
Taking advantage of this, IPchain allows its par-
ticipants to exchange IP prefixes just like in coins
are transferred in Bitcoin. This way, an ISP can
record in the chain its IP addresses and who can
advertise them. When another ISP receives a BGP
announcement with these addresses, it can deter-
mine if they come from the intended source.
We have built a prototype to demonstrate
IPchain’s suitability to this scenario, both from the
scalability and performance standpoints. The pro-
totype allows allocating and delegating IP prefixes
by means of blockchain transactions, and uses a
Proof of Stake consensus algorithm to randomly
select block signers among all the holders of IP ad-
dresses. In our experimental evaluation, we recre-
ated the real-life allocation hierarchy of IP ad-
dresses, storing around 50% of the total Internet
Registries’ prefixes in a 1 GB chain.
2 Background: RPKI Archi-
tecture
IP addresses are allocated to Internet domains fol-
lowing a hierarchical scheme, typically conformed
of three tiers (figure 5). The Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA1), as the top-level reg-
ulator of Internet numbers, owns the entire ad-
dress space. First, IANA allocates large blocks of
addresses to the Regional Internet Registries (1).
Those, in turn, allocate or delegate blocks to its
customers, usually ISPs (2). Finally, ISPs can also
assign addresses to their users (3). Equivalently for
AS numbers.
The RPKI replicates this structure using digital
certificates that allow authenticating the allocation
of both IP prefixes and AS numbers (figure 2). A
party receives a them via a Resource Certificate
(RC), which binds an IP prefix or AS number to
a public key (1). It can then further allocate this
resource to other parties by means of issuing new
RCs (2, dashed line). It can also issue a Route
Origin Authorization (ROA), which authorizes an
AS number to announce an IP prefix (3). Parties
that own RCs can issue one or more ROAs (4).
This way, network operators can download the
certificates and use them to verify BGP announce-
ments. If the (IP prefix, AS number) pair in the
BGP message does not match the corresponding
certificate in the RPKI, the announcement is con-
sidered invalid.
1https://www.iana.org/numbers
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RC (Alice) 
150/8
ROA 1
150/8 + AS 4 
RC (Bob)
150.100/16
ROA 2 
150.100/16 + AS 8
ROA 3
150.100/16 + AS 5
(1)
(2)(3)
(4)
Figure 2: Sample RPKI certificate hierarchy.
3 Why blockchain?
Blockchains have many interesting advantages. In
this section we discuss why a blockchain suits the
requirements of secure allocation and delegation of
IP addresses.
Flexible trust models: Some researchers argue
that the centralized nature of the RPKI hinders its
deployment[6]. This is due to the fact that its users
(typically ISPs) have to trust the RPKI CA, which
can arbitrarily revoke any downstream certificate
[9]. Since IP addresses are an important economi-
cal asset for most ISPs, this situation is sometimes
judged as inappropriate.
On the contrary, the decentralized trust model
of blockchains can mitigate these concerns, since
the owner of the public-private key pair retains ul-
timate control over its resources.
Simplified management: the RPKI is cum-
bersome to manage, for example, users have to
choose between two operation modes. Some ac-
tions are complex, like key rollover (RFC 6489 is
specifically devoted to key rollover in the RPKI2),
because it requires re-signing all downstream cer-
tificates starting from the one being replaced. On
the contrary, a key rollover in a blockchain can
be easily performed transferring a coin/asset to a
new address (keypair). Other operations, such as
the revocation of a transaction, do not require a
dedicated sub-system (Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) in a PKI), but only adding a new transac-
tion.
Privacy: Blockchain transactions are not linked
2https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6489.txt
to the user’s identity, just to a public key. It is
worth noting that the RPKI also offers privacy, be-
cause its certificates do not contain identity infor-
mation.
Consistent vision of the state : Exactly like
in Bitcoin, in the RPKI we need to keep track of
the owner of each IP prefix (coins), e.g. to avoid
the transfer of the same prefix to two different
users (double-spending). In other words, we need
to maintain a global vision of the state. Achiev-
ing this is easier in a blockchain when compared to
the RPKI: the latter has to update state via spe-
cific protocols3, processing of CRLs and manifests,
etc, while in a blockchain these mechanisms directly
arise from its transactional nature.
Auditability: Given the permanent nature of
blockchain records, it is possible to determine if an
object (e.g. a ROA) utilizing a particular resource
(e.g. an IP address) has been made obsolete by a
new object. In addition, a permanent ledger avoids
situations where deleting an object inadvertently
impacts other operators [13]. While this can be
engineered in a PKI4, blockchains have this feature
built-in.
4 Which consensus algo-
rithm?
Consensus algorithms are probably the most im-
portant building block of a blockchain. This sec-
tion details the motivations when deciding which
one to use for the use-case of securing IP address
allocation and delegation.
4.1 Proof of Work
In Proof of Work (PoW), nodes in the blockchain
have to solve a complex mathematical problem to
add a block, thus requiring some computational ef-
fort. The definitive chain is the one with most com-
puting power spent to create.
Despite its widespread usage, PoW is not suit-
able for our use case. In financial environments,
PoW suits quite well because it is easy to find a
large number of participants, either to create new
transactions (money transfer is a popular applica-
tion) or to add blocks (thanks to the block reward
3https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8181.txt
4https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/about/
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mechanism). However, in our use case this does
not hold: the potential amount of members is lower
than in financial use-cases and it is unclear which
would be the reward.
In addition, PoW blockchains (typically) decou-
ple its users from the management of the chain, i.e.,
we can transfer money in Bitcoin without having to
create blocks. This user-miner separation can im-
pact negatively on the chain, since the capability to
add new blocks and the security of the chain itself
depend on the computing power of the participants
(miners), which is not always aligned with their in-
terest in the well-being of the blockchain (users).
Depending on the objectives of an attacker, certain
attacks can become profitable. Namely, buying a
large quantity of hardware to be able to rewrite the
blockchain with false data (e.g., incorrect delega-
tions of IP addresses). This is very costly in block-
chains with a high amount of participants such as
Bitcoin or Ethereum (in the order of millions), but
in a blockcahin for IP addresses it becomes feasible
(the current number of Autonomous Systems in the
Internet is around 60k5).
4.2 Proof of Stake for IP prefix allo-
cation and delegation
In a Proof of Stake (PoS [14]) blockchain, partici-
pants with more assets/coins are more likely to add
blocks. In essence, PoS algorithms randomly select
one of the users to sign the next block. The selec-
tion is randomly weighted according to the num-
ber of coins of each participant, thus ensuring that
users with more interest (stake) in the chain con-
tribute proportionally more to it.
With this premise, we advocate that PoS is the
most convenient consensus algorithm for our sce-
nario. First, in PoS the capability to alter the
blockchain remains within it. This aspect is of
particular importance in the context of IPchain:
users holding a large number of IP addresses are
more likely to add blocks. A key insight of this
paper (and a uniqueness of our scenario) is that
participants have a reduced incentive in tampering
the blockchain because they would suffer the con-
sequences: an insecure Internet. Typically entities
that hold large blocks of IP address space have their
business within the Internet and as such, have clear
5http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/
From: Registry-1
To: Registry-1
(1) Allocation
From: Registry-1
To: ISP A
(2) Allocation
(3) Delegation
From: ISP A
To: Customer 1
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From: Customer 1 
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I have all 
prefixes
Prefix 1/8 for 
ISP A
Customer 1 
has 1.2/16
Bind 1.2/16 to 
AS # 12345
Figure 3: Transaction workflow example
incentives in the correct operation and security of
the Internet (section 4 in the technical annex).
Second, the risk of takeover is reduced compared
to Proof of Work: accumulating a large amount of
IP addresses is typically more complex than accu-
mulating computing power. The risk of takeover is
also mitigated compared to other PoS-based block-
chains. In a typical PoS blockchain for financial
environments, an attacker would buy tokens from
the other parties, who receive a monetary compen-
sation to participate in the attack (c.f. section 2 in
the technical annex). However, in a blockchain for
IP addresses this would mean buying IP addresses
from other parties. These parties do not have a
clear incentive to sell their blocks of addresses to
the attacker since IP addresses are an important
economical asset.
Finally, we must also remark the advantages of
PoS algorithms: low computational cost and no
need of dedicated hardware, which lowers the entry
barrier to collaborate in the blockchain.
5 Architecture of IPchain
This section describes the architecture of IPchain:
a blockchain to store, allocate and delegate blocks
of IP addresses.
5.1 IP prefixes as coins
IP prefixes share some fundamental characteristics
with the coins or assets we find in any blockchain:
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• They are unambiguously allocated to the par-
ticipants.
• Can be transferred (delegated) between them.
• Can be divided up to a certain limit.
• Cannot be assigned to two participants at the
same time.
Such similar properties make it possible to design
a blockchain to exchange IP prefixes, similarly as
if they were crypto-coins. With a series of transac-
tions we can mimic RPKI’s allocation hierarchy in
the blockchain and build a consistent view of the
legitimate holders of IP prefixes. Figure 3 shows an
example of this operation: first, Internet Registries
(entities that allocate IP addresses) write transac-
tions assigning all the address space to themselves
(1). Ideally, this first transaction is encoded in the
genesis block. Second, the Registries allocate pre-
fixes to ISPs (2), which in turn allocate them to
their customers (3). Finally, customers bind meta-
data to their prefixes, such as their AS number (4).
Since the genesis block contains all the prefixes
that can be allocated, anyone that downloads the
blockchain can validate the chain of allocations and
delegations of addresses. If a particular prefix can-
not be tracked back to the genesis block, it is in-
valid.
5.2 Overview
Figure 4 presents a sample of IPchain’s workflow.
First, router r1 writes in the chain its legitimate
prefix (1). Now, consider that the announcement
propagates through the network and is modified by
the rough router (center). When router r3 receives
the announcement of 150/8 to r2, it can check in
the blockchain (2) if 150/8 is actually originated by
router 2. In this case 150/8 should be originated by
router r1, so the announcement is deemed invalid.
5.3 PoS Consensus Algorithm
As mentioned in section 4.2, PoS is fits the require-
ments of our use-case. In this scenario, the selection
of the next block signer works the following way:
1. Count the number of addresses owned by each
participant
Chain
r1
r2
rogue 
router
150/8 to r2
r3
Modified 
route
150/8 to R1
205/8 to R2
Chain
150/8 to R1
205/8 to R2
(1)
(2)
Figure 4: Sample usage scenario of IPchain.
2. Generate a random number
3. Select one of the participants with the random
number weighted by their number of addresses
Note that the random number generation is dis-
tributed, i.e., all participants generate the same
number in order to agree on the same signer. In
other words, PoS entails generating a random num-
ber in a secure and distributed way. We can find
examples in the literature on how to this, such as
the Round-Robin Random Number Generator [15]
or the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [16]. In ad-
dition, more recent algorithms have been proposed
specifically designed for blockchains, such as Algo-
rand [17] or Ouroboros [18].
Moreover, in IPchain a reward mechanism (like
Bitcoin’s block reward) or a punishment for mis-
behavior (c.f. security deposits in some PoS algo-
rithms) are both undesirable. The former because
in this case the incentive is a consistent view of the
IP allocation hierarchy and a secure routing infras-
tructure (and PoS algorithms do not consume high
amounts of energy, c.f. section 1 in the technical
annex). The latter, because removing IP addresses
from a party rarely happens in real-life and gener-
ates more severe consequences than not refunding
a coin deposit.
5.4 Supported Operations
A blockchain for IP addresses has to provide equiv-
alent operations to those performed typically in
these process. Similarly to RPKI’s logic, we de-
fined the following operations:
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Allocate: Assign a block of IP prefixes to an
entity, allowing it to further allocate or delegate it
to other entities.
Delegate: Like Allocate, but without the per-
mission to allocate prefixes to other entities.6
Metadata: Add additional data to a prefix, eg.
AS number authorized to announce the prefix.
5.5 Deployment
The deployment of our proposed blockchain mimics
the current procedure used to allocate IP addresses,
which is typically conformed of three tiers (figure
5). IANA, as the top-level regulator of Internet
numbers, owns the genesis block keys. First, IANA
allocates huge blocks of addresses to the Regional
Internet Registries (1). Those, in turn, allocate or
delegate blocks to its customers, usually ISPs (2).
Finally, ISPs can also assign addresses to their users
(3).
Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA)
(1)
Regional Internet Registries 
(RIR)
(2)
ISPs, Organizations, etc
(3)
Customers, end users
Figure 5: IP address allocation hierarchy.
This way, when bootstrapping the blockchain we
only need to trust the code (which has the genesis
block embedded).
5.6 Flexible Trust: Revocation
Due to the irreversible nature of blockchain trans-
actions, once a block of IP addresses has been al-
located to an entity it is not possible to modify or
remove it, as opposed to CRLs. However, due to
operational issues (compromised or lost keys, hu-
man mistake, holder misbehavior, etc) it is critical
to provide a way to recover a block of addresses.
6A delegated prefix cannot be further allocated.
Moreover, since IP addresses are a finite public
good they cannot be lost, in contrast to crypto-
currencies: the loss of a coin only causes damage
to its owner, not the entire community.
If we consider that a blockchain can enforce any
rules its participants agree upon, we can devise
some mechanisms that maintain blockchain’s in-
herent decentralization but leave the door open to
handle these exceptional situations. A potential
approach (but not the only one) is the following:
in case of dispute between a RIR and a customer, a
third party (e.g. IANA) issues a revocation trans-
action reassigning the resource.
Despite these remarks, the revocation procedure
must be discussed among the community to achieve
consensus between the relevant players (IANA,
RIRs, ISPs, institutions, etc), taking into account
that behind any revocation mechanism there is a
fundamental tradeoff between trusting an upstream
provider of the addresses (traditional, centralized
PKI) and retaining full control of the block of ad-
dresses (e.g. Bitcoin-like totally decentralized sys-
tems).
5.7 Other considerations
Rekeying: Rekeying is a common operation in the
RPKI and involves re-signing all downstream cer-
tificates with the new key. On the contrary, this op-
eration is greatly simplified in blockchain: we only
have to add a new transaction re-allocating the IP
prefix to a new keypair controlled by ourselves. In
addition, since transactions are independent from
each other, we can perform rekeying operations in-
dividually without affecting other users.
Privacy: Since IP addresses are linked to their
owners’ public key, it is not possible to identify the
holder only with the data in the blockchain. In that
sense, blockchain offers a similar degree of privacy
to the RPKI.
IPv6 support: Since IP version 4 and 6 prefixes
are currently being used, IPchain needs to support
both. However, this is not trivial because there
are more IPv6 addresses (128 bits) than IPv4 (32
bits). In a PoS blockchain, randomly selecting from
both pools of addresses would create an imbalance
of power between and v6 and v4 owners (the first
would create much more blocks than the latter).
Taking this into account, we never mix v4 and
v6 addresses in IPchain. We create alternatively
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blocks of v4 or v6 transactions: even blocks con-
tain v4 transactions and are signed by the owner
of a v4 prefix. The same for odd blocks and v6
transactions. This solution does not require two
different blockchains and isolates v4 and v6 stake.
Finally, it should also be noted that, due to the
huge size of v6 address space, large parts of it re-
main unallocated and still owned by IANA (less
than 0.5% of v6 address space has been allocated
to the Regional Internet Registries). This space
should be ignored (not counted) to avoid IANA
signing nearly all v6 blocks and thus, preventing
an IANA monopoly.
6 Implementation
We have built an open-source prototype and made
it publicly available7. We did not to fork an ex-
isting blockchain implementation since they do not
fit our needs, particularly regarding the consensus
algorithm.
The IPchain prototype is written in Python (fig-
ure 6) and performs all the typical blockchain op-
erations. The transaction structure and validation
logic implements the operations defined in section
5.4 for both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. In order
to ease user interaction, the prototype reads new
transactions from a file, signs and sends them to
the network, and provides an integrated keystore
to encrypt user’s keys.
The prototype has also an interface to commu-
nicate with OpenOverlayRouter (OOR [19]). OOR
is an open-source software router that implements
the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP, RFC
6830). In short, OOR deploys programmable over-
lay networks to dynamically tunnel traffic through
the underlay network. With this interface, OOR
can retrieve from IPchain metadata associated with
the IP addresses, required to answer some LISP
messages.
Data Structures: IPchain builds on
Ethereum’s account system, which maps pairs
of blockchain addresses with the associated IP
addresses. Transactions are encoded as modifica-
tions to accounts. We chose this model instead
of Bitcoin’s UTXO because it requires less stor-
age and data access is easier. We modified the
7https://github.com/OpenOverlayRouter/blockchain-
mapping-system
Consen-
sus
User 
input
P2P
Chain 
persistence
Blocks
Current 
state
Transaction 
pool
OOR 
Interface
Main loop
OOR
Map Resolv.
Keystore
New 
transact-
tions file
Keys
NIST 
Beacon
P2P
Network
Figure 6: IPchain prototype architecture.
PyEthereum8 Trie, DB, Utils and Transactions
classes to fit our needs, and capped the block size
at 2 MB.
PoS Consensus Algorithm: For simplicity,
we use NIST’s random beacon9 to select the signer
of the next block. This beacon changes every 60
seconds, so we set this interval as our block time.
This small blocktime forced us to maintain synchro-
nism among the nodes in the network by means
of the Network Time Protocol (NTP). A timeout
mechanism selects a new signer when the original is
disconnected. Obviously, this cannot be the defini-
tive solution in a production system.
Peer-to-Peer Network: The P2P mod-
ule implements all communication functions
in a broadcast-all fashion, leveraging Pyhton’s
Twisted10 library for network communication.
Since it does not connect all the nodes between
themselves, a Distributed Hash Table11 keeps track
of the last block number, so that if a node misses
some blocks it can request them.
7 Experimental evaluation
7.1 Scenario
The objective of our experiment was to store all
the IP prefixes allocated by the five RIRs in the
blockchain, so we could evaluate IPchain’s suitabil-
ity and performance in a real-life scenario. To this
end, we recreated the aforementioned three-tier hi-
erarchy (section 5.5) in a cloud service. We de-
8https://github.com/ethereum/pyethereum
9https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-
randomness-beacon
10https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/
11https://github.com/cliftonm/kademlia-1
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ployed 9 virtual machines, each in a different lo-
cation around the world: North California, North
Virginia, Sa˜o Paulo, Ireland, Barcelona, Frankfurt,
Mumbai, Tokyo and Sydney. One of them was a
bootstrap node (that acted as IANA) and the re-
maining 8 nodes represented the RIRs. We encoded
in the genesis block the entire v4 and v6 address
space (splitting them in the same blocks specified in
IANA’s registries of v412 and v613 address space),
and stored all their keys in the bootstrap node.
We then generated a distinct set of transactions
for each node to simulate the allocations of IANA
and the registries.
7.2 Methodology
We generated three levels of transactions to repro-
duce the process in figure 5. For the first and second
levels, we uniformly created smaller prefixes from
the ones in the genesis block. The prefixes for the
third level were extracted directly from the publicly
available lists containing the Registries’ address al-
locations14, so we could record real prefixes in the
chain. In all three steps, we allocated the prefixes
uniformly among all RIR nodes. In total, we gener-
ated around 200k transactions (70k in levels 1 and
2, 130k in level 3), far from the 260k in the RIR
files.
7.3 Results
During our test we measured several blockchain
metrics, aimed at characterizing the performance
and scalability of IPchain. We focus our analysis on
four key metrics: (i) throughput, (ii) delay to add
a transaction, (iii) bootstrap time, and (iv) chain
size. The test run presented here lasted approxi-
mately 30 hours with 1376 blocks created and 160k
transactions successfully processed. During the ex-
periment some nodes crashed due to communica-
tion issues with the NIST beacon. Our prototype
recovered automatically (as one would expect from
a distributed system).
Blocktime: Figure 7 presents the time between
each consecutive block. We can see that in nearly
12https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-
space/ipv4-address-space.xhtml
13https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-
space/ipv6-address-space.xhtml
14https://www.nro.net/statistics/
all cases it is around the configured interval of 60
seconds, thus confirming the correct operation of
our PoS consensus algorithm. The spikes corre-
spond to the aforementioned node crashes. In that
situation, after 900 seconds, a new node was au-
tomatically selected by the consensus algorithm to
sign that block. The height of the spikes corre-
sponds with these 900 seconds.
Transaction delay: The average delay to add a
transaction is usually around 60 seconds, increasing
in the same blocks than in figure 7, due to the delay
to create a new block. In our context, this delay is
completely acceptable, since this operations in real-
life take much more time to process. We infer that
we could not overload the system (the minimum
time to add a transaction oscillates between 0 and
120 seconds, depending if in this moment a v4 or v6
block is created), otherwise the average delay would
be higher. Finding the saturation point remains as
future work.
Throughput: Figure 8 plots the number of
transactions per block, separated for v4 and v6
transactions. The graph outlines the three distinct
phases of the experiment detailed in section 7.2:
level 1 (the initial allocation from the bootstrap
node to the RIR nodes, a), level 2 (the allocation
of prefixes between the RIRs, b), and level 3 (the
final allocation of RIR prefixes, c). In the latter,
we appreciate a high variability in the number of
transactions in a block, roughly spanning from 100
to 250 transactions for v4 blocks and from 50 to
100 for v6 blocks. This is due to several reasons:
(i) the non-uniform distribution of v4 and v6 trans-
actions in the input files: the proportion of v4 and
v6 transactions is not constant for the entire file.
Since nodes process transactions at a fixed speed,
regardless if they are v4 or v6, in a given period
of time a node may not issue a constant number
of v4 or v6 transactions. (ii) the crash of a node:
after a restart, nodes wait 35 minutes before start-
ing to add transactions, and (iii) nodes had differ-
ent number of transactions, so they stopped adding
transactions at different moments in time. Again,
the spikes in the number of transactions correspond
to the aforementioned delayed blocks, due to the
pending transactions accumulated during these in-
tervals. In addition, some of these transactions may
have been considered invalid because they were ref-
erencing transactions not yet included in the chain,
further increasing this variability.
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Figure 8: Number of transactions in each block. We can see the consequence of the non-uniform
distribution of v4 and v6 transactions between blocks 300 and 400 (d, where we start to add RIR v6
transactions): the number of v4 transactions reduces.
The maximum number of transactions per block
revolves around 370 (section (b) in figure 8), so we
can estimate IPchain’s throughput to be approxi-
mately 6 transactions per second, in the same order
of magnitude of Bitcoin.
7.3.1 Bootstrap test
The bootstrap test is of special interest, because
it quantifies IPchain’s overall cost in terms of time
and compute resources. After storing all the allo-
cations in the chain, we added a new node to the
network and measured how long it took to verify
the entire chain (figure 9). The time to download
the blocks is negligible compared to the validation
time. Using a VM with one associated virtual CPU
(Intel Xeon @ 3.3 GHz) and 2 GB RAM, the boot-
strap time was 7 hours.
We also recorded the total chain size as we added
more prefixes (figure 9), reaching around 1 GB for
150k prefixes. In this case, the size grows in a linear
fashion with the number of prefixes. Since it is in
the order of GB, we can conclude that the chain
scales well for our use-case.
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Figure 9: Bootstrap test: startup time and total
chain size.
8 Related work
Blockchain Applications for Networking:
Several blockchain applications oriented for net-
works have been proposed [20], such as BGP an-
nouncements [21], the Internet of Things [22], Infor-
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mation Centric Networking [23] or distributed ac-
cess control [24]. However, the largest body of work
focuses on providing naming applications with sim-
ilar functions to the DNS: Namecoin15, Blockstack
[25], Ethereum Name System16, etc. To the best
of our knowledge, IPchain is the first blockchain
specifically tailored for the allocation and delega-
tion of IP addresses.
PoS Consensus Algorithms: Some interest-
ing PoS algorithms are already in production sys-
tems, such as NEM’s Proof of Importance [26], a
modified version of PoS that takes into account not
only the stake but also the transaction graph topol-
ogy and frequency. However, in IPchain we cannot
rely on the frequency of transactions like NEM be-
cause our scenario is not as dynamic as financial
systems.
Another promising PoS algorithm is Ethereum’s
Casper [27], still in development. However, Casper
uses a punishment mechanism (remove part of the
security deposit) that, as we described earlier in sec
5.3 does not make sense here.
Social Network Consensus Algorithms: In
such algorithms, like Stellar [28], each user has
a set of trusted nodes, and only accepts transac-
tions if they have been validated by these nodes.
Although they present an interesting alternative,
we consider them less suitable for IPchain than
Proof of Stake, because they typically require some
kind of certificate-based identification system for
the nodes, thus losing one of IPchain’s fundamen-
tal advantages.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced IPchain, a Proof
of Stake blockchain to store the allocation and del-
egations of IP addresses. We have discussed its ad-
vantages over existing systems, such as simplified
management or flexible trust models, and the ben-
efits of a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm in this
particular context. Finally, we have presented per-
formance data of our implementation when storing
RIR data.
15https://namecoin.org/
16https://ens.domains/
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A Security Analysis
This technical annex presents a list of the most rel-
evant attacks against our Proof of Stake algorithm,
and strategies on how to mitigate them.
A.1 Nothing at Stake
Nothing at stake [14] is one of the fundamental
drawbacks of Proof of Stake and requires careful de-
sign based on the incentives of the participants. In
common PoS designs, the signers of the new block
receive an economical incentive (e.g., Ethereum).
However, since in PoS creating forks is costless (as
opposed to PoW), a participant may extend more
than one of the existing forks (note that in PoW
this does not make sense, as it means dividing your
computing resources) to make sure it will get the
block reward regardless of the winning chain. Ul-
timately, this leads to an endless number of forks
and the blockchain not reaching consensus. What’s
worse, this may occur because of the monetary in-
centive, not due to a malicious attacker.
On the contrary, this does not hold in IPchain
address since participants do not receive any incen-
tive. The incentive is, as stated before, achieving a
consistent view of the IP address space and having
a secure Internet.
A.2 Range Attacks
A range attack [29] is performed by creating a fork
some blocks back from the tip of the chain (it can
be a few blocks ∼500 (short range attack) or a large
amount ∼10000 (long range attack)). In this sce-
nario, the attacker has privately fabricated a chain
which (according to the consensus algorithm rules)
will be selected over the original one. Benefits of
this attack include gaining more stake on the block-
chain (this attack could be part of a stake grinding
attack) or rewriting the transaction history to erase
a payment made in the original blockchain.
The simplest solution to this attack is adding
a revert limit to the blockchain, forbidding forks
going back more than N blocks. This provides a
means to solidify the blockchain. However, nodes
that have been offline for more than N blocks will
need an external source that indicates the correct
chain. It has been proposed to do this out of band.
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This is why some PoS algorithms are not purely
trustless and require a small amount of trust.
A.3 Stake Grinding
Stake grinding refers to the manipulation of the
consensus algorithm in order to progressively ob-
tain more stake, with the goal of signing blocks
more frequently with the ultimate goal of taking
control of the blockchain. It proceeds as follows:
when the attacker has to sign a block, it com-
putes all the possible blocks (varying the data in-
side them) to find a combination that gives the
highest possibility of signing another block in the
future. It then signs this block and sends it to the
network. This procedure is repeated for all the next
signing opportunities. Over time, the attacker will
sign more and more blocks until the consensus al-
gorithm will always select the attacker to sign all
blocks, thereby having taken control of the block-
chain.
To prevent this attack, the source of randomness
used to select the signers has to be hard to alter or
to predict.
A.4 Monopolies
A crucial problem in PoS algorithms are monopo-
lies, i.e. a single party controlling enough IP ad-
dresses so it can sign a significant proportion of
new blocks, thus being able to decide which infor-
mation is written in the chain (a 51% attack in
Bitcoin). However, in our case this is of less con-
cern, because parties do not have an incentive to
alter normal chain operation. Even if a single party
could control the chain, rewriting data would end
up impacting its own infrastructure, because some
of its customers would be unable to access other
networks. In other words, the incentive is a secure
Internet, and any ISP benefits from this.
A.5 Lack of participation
Participants in a PoS algorithm will not always sign
a block, since they might be offline when they are
selected or lack incentives. Because of this, the
final fraction of high-stakers that sign blocks can
be very different from the full set of high-stakers.
The direct consequence of this situation is that the
portion of participants that decide what goes into
the blockchain can be a small set of nodes. If this
participation is low enough, it can leave the con-
trol of the blockchain to a small amount of peo-
ple/oligarchy, thus rising security concerns.
A.6 Infrastructure Attacks
This section presents attacks directed towards the
underlying P2P network used to exchange informa-
tion among the participants of the blockchain.
A.6.1 DDoS Attacks
Since blockchains are inherently based on P2P ar-
chitectures, they present a higher degree of resis-
tance to DDoS attacks than centralized server ar-
chitectures, provided that the network has a sig-
nificant number of participants. In addition, it is
always possible to keep an offline copy of the block-
chain.
A.6.2 Transaction flooding
A special type of DDoS attack consists in creating
a large amount of legit transactions that transfer
a small amount of tokens (i.e. delegate a lot of
small IP prefixes). If the number of transactions is
large enough, the addition of new transactions can
be significantly delayed because not all of them fit
into a single block. The effectiveness of the attack
also depends on the throughput of the blockchain
(transactions/second). Simple solutions may be to
limit the granularity upon which IP addresses can
be split. Of course, only the legitimate holder of a
large amount of IP address can perform this attack.
A.6.3 Routing Attacks
The underlying P2P network in blockchains does
not typically use any security mechanism, e.g.
node authentication or integrity of network proto-
col messages. This enables potentially disruptive
attacks. For example, specially located rogue nodes
could drop new transactions, which would block up-
dates on the blockchain and leave legit nodes iso-
lated. The effectiveness of this kind of attacks de-
pends on how the P2P algorithm selects peers and
the topology of the P2P network.
However, the most potentially dangerous attack
of this type are network partitions, i.e. isolating a
group of nodes from the rest of the network so they
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cannot communicate each other [30]. The conse-
quence of this attack is that two versions of the
blockchain are created, one at each network parti-
tion. When the partition disappears and the nodes
reconnect one of the two chains will be discarded,
causing a service disruption. It is worth noting that
Bitcoin has suffered similar attacks [2].
A.6.4 Transaction Censorship
When a node adds a block it chooses arbitrarily
which transactions are added into it, i.e. no spe-
cific rules control how transactions are added to
a block. This enables a node to selectively add
some transactions and intentionally exclude others,
with the consequence that some transactions may
be never added to the blockchain. In the context
of IP addresses, this may be performed by a com-
peting ISP to prevent another ISP from executing
a certain modification. Possible solutions revolve
around: giving more priority to older transactions
(similarly to Bitcoin), or punishing nodes that ex-
hibit this kind of behavior, e.g. removing part of
their block of IP addresses or lowering their chance
of adding blocks.
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